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BEHAVIORAL GENETICS AND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD DECISION RULE
DavidJ. Herring*
This Article proposes that modern child custody law should be reassessed in light
of recent scientific findings. Judicial determinations of custody use the "best inter-
ests of the child" rule. The rule is justified to a large extent by the goal of
maximizing child developmental outcomes. The assumption is that a child whose
"best interests" are protected stands a better chance of becoming a socially well-
adjusted, productive and prosperous citizen.
Recent child development studies have shown that so-called "shared environ-
ment, "or home environment factors have little effect on child development so long
as the shared environment is minimally adequate. Genetics and "non-shared en-
vironment" have a far greater influence on child development outcomes. While
other reasons for the "best interests" rule may ultimately justify it, maximizing
positive child development is not ajustification supported by science.
I. PROLOGUE-A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH
TO LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
This article had its genesis in the popular book written by Judith
Rich Harris, The Nurture Assumption.' This author's research in-
cluded consulting many of the scientific articles and books cited by
Harris. Her work directed the author to the basic science research
literature in the area of behavioral genetics.
The behavioral genetics literature is fascinating not only on a
substantive level, but also on a procedural level. Although the au-
thors of the relevant articles and books have engaged in extensive,
highly sophisticated studies and analyses, they use their findings to
make rather modest points. The points they make are modest in
two senses. First, they advance the knowledge in their field in
small, incremental steps. Their writings neither reveal great leaps
in knowledge, nor articulate comprehensive solutions, but rather
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convey the cooperative nature of their endeavor and their own
limited role within a community of scientific colleagues. Second,
they invariably present their findings as tentative steps of discovery,
acknowledging the possibility, even likelihood, that their findings
will be discredited, and certainly modified. In fact, they expressly
hope for these results.
For these two reasons, and likely several others, the nature of
scientific scholarship and the role of the scientific scholar stand in
sharp contrast to the general nature of legal scholarship and the
primary role of legal scholars. Legal scholarship tends to engage in
comprehensive discussions of large issues and to propose grand
solutions. The scholarly steps in the legal field tend to be large and
to be expressed with deliberate certainty and finality.
A scholarly approach characterized by a common effort in
which individual scholars take small, careful steps is valid not only
in the attempt to discover basic knowledge about the functioning
of the world. This scholarly approach is also valid in the attempt to
apply basic knowledge to human problems and systems-the pri-
mary focus of the legal scholar. This article is an experiment in
utilizing this approach to examine a discrete rule of decision-
namely, the best interests of the child standard applied in child
custody disputes involving fit parents.
II. INTRODUCTION
Behavioral genetic studies challenge one of the basic assump-
tions that underlie the best interests of the child standard. This
assumption is that parental nurture is the primary source of chil-
dren's differential developmental outcomes in terms of personality2
traits. There are other potential justifications for the best interests
of the child standard, such as maximizing current child happiness
or socioeconomic status. These are outside the scope of this arti-
cle, which examines the best interests of the child standard only
insofar as it is justified by securing optimal child development out-
comes. Part III of this article describes the findings from
behavioral genetic studies. Part IV explores the implications of
these findings for the best interests of the child decision rule.
2. Id. at 15.
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III. BEHAVIORAL GENETICS
Robert Plomin and Denise Daniels wrote a landmark article in
1987, posing the question, "Why are children in the same family so
different from one another?"' This question arose from human
behavioral genetic studies utilizing the two major designs: the
adoption design and the twin design. These designs
were developed to circumvent the problem of conflating ge-
netic and environmental influences in studies of family
members who share heredity and family environments. By do-
ing so, the designs partition environmental variance into two
components: one shared by members of a family and the
other consisting of the remainder of the environmental vari-
ance, which is referred to as nonshared environment.4
Behavioral genetic studies allow researchers to determine the
proportion of a specific developmental outcome attributable to
each of three general influences: an individual's genetic inheri-
tance, the portion of an individual's environment that she shares
with other members of her family, and the portion of an individ-
ual's environment that she does not share with other members of
her family.
So, how do twin and adoption studies allow for the attribution
and quantification of causes of developmental outcomes? Twin
studies compare the personality-trait resemblance of identical
twins with that of same-sex fraternal twins. Adoption studies com-
pare genetically-related individuals who are raised in different
family environments or genetically unrelated individuals who are
raised within the same family environment. Twin studies are exam-
ined first.
As described by Plomin and Daniels, the genetic coefficient (a
measure of the degree of relatedness between two people) for a
parent and his biological child is .50i' In other words, they share
3. Robert Plomin & Denise Daniels, Why Are Childien in the Same Family So Different
From One Another?, 10 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCIENCES 1 (1987).
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id. at 2-4. See, e.g., ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1985). See also DAVID
REISS ET AL., THE RELATIONSHIP CODE: DECIPHERING GENETIC AND SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON
ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 6 (Harvard University Press 2000). While it is true that every
human shares the vast majority of his or her genes with every other human, the degree of
relatedness for genetic material that determines differences among individuals corresponds
to the coefficients identified by Reiss et al. and described in the text of this article.
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half of their segregating genetic code. The genetic coefficient for
full biological siblings is also .50, except for identical twins, whose
genetic coefficient is 1.00. Identical or monozygotic twins share all
of their genetic material. Fraternal or dizygotic twins are the same
as any other set of siblings, sharing only half of their genetic
makeup. Half siblings have a genetic coefficient of .25, while bio-
logically unrelated individuals such as a parent and an adopted
child have a genetic coefficient of 0 because they do not share ge-
netic material.
These varying degrees of relatedness allow behavioral geneticists
to design and conduct studies that calculate the percentage of cor-
relation between individuals attributable to genetic factors. For
example, twin studies compare the resemblance of identical twins
with that of same-sex fraternal twins. As noted above, identical
twins are twice as similar genetically as fraternal twins. Plomin and
Daniels explain the relevance of this genetic information for twin
studies:
If heredity affects a trait, the twofold greater genetic similarity
of identical twins will make them more similar than fraternal
twins with respect to a particular trait. The difference between
the correlations for identical twins and fraternal twins is an es-
timate of roughly half of the genetic variance in the
population because the coefficient of genetic relationship is
1.0 for identical twins and .50 for fraternal twins. Thus, for a
trait completely determined by heredity, the expected corre-
lations are 1.0 for identical twins and .50 for fraternal twins. If
the pattern of twin correlations were .75 and .50 for identical
and fraternal twins, respectively, heredity would be estimated
to explain half of the phenotypic variance for the trait. If he-
redity does not affect the trait, the twofold greater genetic
similarity of identical twins will not make them more similar
than fraternal twins for the particular trait.6
Twin studies not only allow for a determination of the percent-
age of correlation attributable to shared genes, but also the
percentage of correlation attributable to shared environment and
nonshared environment. Plomin and Daniels give two examples to
illustrate this point.
First, take the case in which the correlation for a trait between
identical twins is .50 and the correlation between fraternal twins is
.25. In this case .50 of the variance is genetic and .50 is nongenetic.
6. Plomin & Daniels, supra note 3, at 3.
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(Genetic variance is calculated as twice the difference between
identical twin correlation and fraternal twin correlation. In
mathematical terms, this calculation is as follows: correlation be-
tween individuals with 100% shared genetic material-correlation
between individuals with 50% shared genetic material x 2 = 100%
of genetic variance among individuals.) And because identical
twins are identical genetically, the .50 correlation is all attributable
to genetic similarities. There are no similarities beyond this and
thus there is no room to assign a portion of the correlation to
shared environmental factors. The .50 noncorrelation must be due
to nonshared environmental factors or measurement error in cal-
culating the trait correlation between individuals.7
Second, take the case in which the correlation for a trait be-
tween identical twins is .75 and the correlation between fraternal
twins is .50. As in the first example, .50 of the variance is genetic
and .50 is nongenetic (again, genetic variance is calculated as twice
the difference between identical twin correlation and fraternal
twin correlation). Because identical twins are identical genetically,
.50 of the correlation between them is explained by their shared
genes-the maximum possible attributable to genetic effects. The
remaining .25 of correlation is attributable to shared environ-
mental factors and the .25 of noncorrelation is attributable to
nonshared environmental factors and measurement error.8
Plomin and Daniels have described the implications of the
methodology derived from twin studies:
[T]he twin design provides a direct estimate of nonshared
environment-the component of phenotypic variance that is
not shared by members of identical twin pairs. In addition,
the twin design provides an indirect estimate of shared family
environment: It is the component of phenotypic variance that
remains after accountin for genetic variance and nonshared
environmental variance.
The results of actual twin studies illustrate the usefulness and
implications of this methodology. A specific example is provided
by a study of over 12,000 twin pairs in Sweden that focused on the
two important personality traits of extroversion and neuroticism.10
The study revealed twin correlations of .51 and .21 for identical
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and fraternal twins, respectively, for extroversion and correlations
of .50 and .23 for neuroticism. These results indicate that virtually
all the measured correlation is attributable to genetic variance,
with the measured noncorrelation being attributable to nonshared
environmental variance. Although the nonshared environmental
percentage may include measurement error, it is important to note
that there is little room to attribute any correlation to shared envi-
ronmental factors.
Plomin and Daniels discuss a collection of twin studies that focus
on various personality traits and find that the study of Swedish
twins is representative. 2 Twin studies, overall, indicate that varia-
tion among individuals in terms of personality traits is due 40% to
genetic variance, 50% to nonshared environmental variance and
10% to shared environmental variance. In other words, sharing a
family environment accounts for only 10% of the variance between
individuals within the family and individuals not included in the
family. The remainder of the variance among individuals is attrib-
utable to genetic differences and environmental factors peculiar to
the specific individuals.
3
Adoption studies, the second major design utilized in human
behavioral studies, allow behavioral geneticists to test the findings
from twin studies and to explore additional correlation data. 14
Adoption studies compare genetically-related individuals who are
raised in different family environments, or genetically unrelated
individuals who are raised within the same family environment.
The classic and most powerful example of the first type of adop-
tion study involves identical twins adopted into separate homes at
birth and reared in uncorrelated environments. In such a study,
the resemblance of the twins is a direct estimate of variance among
individuals in a population that is due to genetic factors. A correla-
tion of .40 for identical twins reared apart implies that 40% of the
phenotypic variance within a population is genetic in origin. The
noncorrelation measurement of .60 indicates that 60% of the vari-
ance within a population is not explained by genetic differences,
but by environmental differences. It is important to note that this
type of adoption study does not allow for the specific identification





14. See id. at 2-3.
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Other adoption study designs do allow for the identification of
shared and nonshared environmental factors.1 For example, re-
searchers can compare relatives adopted into separate family
environments with relatives reared together. If relatives reared to-
gether are more alike than relatives reared apart, the difference in
correlations provides an estimate of shared environmental effects.
For example, if identical twins raised together correlate at .60 and
identical twins raised apart correlate at .40, 20% of the variance
within a population would be attributable to shared environment.
A more direct estimate of shared environment comes from
adoption studies examining unrelated individuals who have been
adopted into the same family. These individuals share many envi-
ronmental factors-parents, socioeconomic status, neighborhood,
schools, etc. However, these individuals do not share heredity.
Based on these facts, the correlation of traits between unrelated
children adopted together directly estimates the amount of varia-
tion among individuals in a population that is due to shared
environmental factors. Thus, a correlation of .20 for a trait be-
tween unrelated children adopted into the same home at birth
indicates that 20% of the variation in the trait is explained by
shared environment. And as Plomin and Daniels state, "A correla-
tion of zero for pairs of adoptees, . . . implies that shared
environment contributes nothing to phenotypic variance, which
implies that all of the environmental variation is nonshared.""
This last type of adoption study methodology has yielded results
that corroborate the findings of twin studies concerning the rela-
tively insignificant effect of shared environmental factors.' 7 For
personality traits, the average adoptive sibling correlation is .04.
Thus, these studies indicate that 4% of the variation in personality
traits within a population is attributable to shared environment.
(This is actually quite a bit lower than the 10% attributable to
shared environment based on the findings of twin studies. As
Plomin and other researchers have speculated, twin studies may
overestimate the effects of shared environment because identical
twins share more experiences than fraternal twins or non-twin sib-
lings) 18
Particularly interesting are adoption studies in the area of cogni-
tion. Early adoption studies indicated that shared environment
15. See id. at 3.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 5.
18. See DAVID ROWE, THE LIMITS OF FAMILY INFLUENCE: GENES, EXPERIENCE, AND BE-
HAVIOR 44-46 (New York: The Guilford Press 1994); REISS ET AL., supra note 5, at 53-55.
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had a substantial impact on differences in IQ among individuals. 9
The average IQ correlation for adoptive siblings is .30, suggesting
that 30% of the variance in IQ scores is due to shared environ-
mental factors. These studies, however, involved only relatively
young adoptive siblings still living within the family home.0
Other adoption studies related to IQ have examined post adoles-
cent adoptive siblings. These studies indicate that the correlations
between adoptive siblings for cognitive abilities approaches 0. These
studies thus indicate that shared environmental factors have no
lasting effect and do not explain the differences in cognitive abili-
ties among individuals.2' After examining one such study, Plomin
and Daniels state, "Thus, this study leads to the conclusion that
shared environmental influence on IQ and specific cognitive abili-
ties is of negligible importance by the end of early adolescence.",2
Summarizing their discussion of twin and adoption studies,
Plomin and Daniels state:
[N]onshared environmental influence is a major component
of variance for personality, psychopathology, and IQ (after
childhood). We conclude that nonshared environment ex-
plains perhaps as much as 40% to 60% of the total variance
for these domains. Although one can quibble with the magni-
tude of our estimates, they would have to be substantially in
error before they would affect our argument that most of the
environmental variance is nonshared.
Twin and adoption studies clearly indicate that nonshared envi-
ronmental factors, along with genetic factors, account for a
significant percentage of the variance among individuals within a
population. In contrast, the environmental factors shared by
members of a family do not account for a significant percentage of
variance among individuals. These findings appear counterintui-
tive, even radical, at first. But they do not mean that family
environments and parents are unimportant. In order to under-
stand more fully what these findings mean, the phrases "shared
environment" and "nonshared environment" must be defined with
more rigor.
19. See Plomin & Daniels, supra note 3, at 6.
20. Id.
21. See id.; see also Robert Plomin et al., Nature, Nurture and Cognitive Development From 1
to 16 Years: A Parent-Offspring Adoption Study, 8 PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 442 (1997).
22. Plomin & Daniels, supra note 3, at 6.
23. Id.
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Shared environment consists of circumstances that equally affect
two or more individuals in a family. 4 The usual focus is on siblings
who live within the same household with their adult parents. A
possible example of a component of the shared environment
would be the specific parents' overall approach to discipline. The
parents may subject all their children to "time-outs," to verbal rep-
rimands, or to physical discipline such as spanking. Each of the
children in the family share experiences as a result of the parents'
disciplinary methods. Other possible aspects of the shared envi-
ronment include the parents' decision as to where to send all their
children to school, the neighborhood setting within which the
family resides, and the type of food consumed at family meals.
There are many more circumstances that children may share
within a specific family context.
In contrast, nonshared environment consists of circumstances
that are different for siblings in the same family. As Reiss states,
"The sum total of these sibling-unique effects on psychological de-
velopment is now known by the term 'nonshared environment.' 
2 5
An example of a nonshared environmental factor is disparate dis-
ciplinary approaches in a family in which a parent uses harsh
physical discipline in dealing with one child's misbehavior, but uses
only verbal reprimands in dealing with her other child's misbehav-
ior. Another example of a sibling-unique effect contributing to the
nonshared environment is a difference in emotional connection in
a family in which a depressed mother withdraws from one of her
children but not another.
It should be noted that the examples of shared environmental
factors are set forth only as possibilities because the definition of
the nonshared environment leaves open the possibility that seem-
ingly shared experiences are actually not shared. For instance,
parents may decide to send all of their children to the same ele-
mentary school. This parental decision seemingly gives rise to the
possibility of many shared experiences among the children. The
children, however, are likely to be in different grades, and even if
they are in the same grade, they are likely to be in different class-
rooms. As a result, the children from this family would interact
with different teachers and different peers. The school setting, al-
though it may provide a degree of shared experience, will also
provide many sibling-unique experiences.
24. See REISS ET AL., supra note 5, at 5; Plomin & Daniels, supra note 3, at 7.
25. REISs ET AL., supra note 5, at 5.
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More fundamentally, children within the same family may per-
ceive like treatment very differently2 For example, a parent may
use physical discipline in dealing with all the children in the family,
but a particular child may view the parent as being especially harsh
with her. Or a particular child may be especially sensitive to physi-
cal discipline, causing the felt experience to depart significantly
from her sibling's experience.
Because of this potential for seemingly shared environmental
factors to result in nonshared experiences, the line between shared
and nonshared environmental factors is not clear, and in fact, is
quite ambiguous. But this fact merely makes the scientific task
more difficult. Attributing effects to these two causal domains will
be incredibly complex and require creative research strategies, but
this complexity does not undermine the basic concept of dividing
environmental causation between shared and nonshared factors.
In their 1987 paper, Plomin and Daniels expressly challenged
behavioral scientists to design studies that would allow them to
identify nonshared environmental factors and their relation to
specific developmental outcomes. Plomin and Daniels focused
researchers on the nonshared environment because of the results
of twin and adoption studies that reveal nonshared environmental
factors to have the strongest influence on differential develop-
ment. Plomin has recently stated:
The message of the [1987] paper was upbeat: there is a new
way, and an empirical tool to study the environment. Namely,
it is to study more than one child per family to find out why
they are so different. Three steps were identified for this re-
search program: (1) document differential experiences,
which requires the construction of measures of the environ-
ment that are specific to each child in the family;
(2) document the association between such differential ex-
periences and differential outcomes; and (3) investigate the
extent to which associations between differential experiences
and differential outcomes are causal 9
The 1987 paper included a listing of possible sources of non-
shared environment, spurring several researchers to begin
26. See Plomin and Daniels, supra note 3, at 9; Robert Plomin, Kathryn Asbury &
Judith Dunn, Why Are Children in the Same Family So Different? Nonshared Environment a Decade
Later, 46 CANADIANJ. PSYCHIATRY 225, 228-29 (2001).
27. See Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 228-29; REISS ET AL., supra note 5.
28. Plomin and Daniels, supra note 3, at 15.
29. Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 226.
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examining specific sources of nonshared environment such as fam-




The largest study undertaken to address Plomin and Daniels'
challenge is the decade-long Nonshared Environment in Adoles-
cent Development (NEAD) project.3' David Reiss, a psychodynamic
family therapist, led this study in which he collaborated with be-
havioral geneticist Plomin and child psychologist E. Maris
Hetherington. As Plomin has stated, "The NEAD project aimed to
address all three steps in the program of research listed [in the
1987 paper], focusing on measures of the family environment and
their effect on adolescent psychopathology in a genetically sensitive
design."3 '2 The NEAD study involved two, two-hour visits at three year
intervals to 720 families with two same-sex sibling children ranging
in age from 10 to 18 years. A battery of questionnaires and inter-
views were administered to both parents and children, and parent
child relationships were videotaped through discussions of prob-
lems in family relationships. These research methodologies yielded
33highly reliable composite measures.
The most interesting aspect of the design of the NEAD study
concerns its sensitivity to genetic factors. In order to identify and
parse out genetic effects, the NEAD project included families that
varied in composition in terms of the genetic relatedness among
members.34 Namely, the 720 NEAD families were selected to in-
clude adolescent children who are identical twins, fraternal twins,
full non-twin siblings, half siblings, and genetically unrelated sib-
lings. Through the inclusion of these different types of families,
the NEAD project allowed for a sophisticated multivariate genetic
analysis.
In the first step of the research program set out by Plomin, the
project staff identified differential experiences of siblings.35 The
children's reports of their family interactions yielded correlations
that were only moderate, indicating a significant degree of differ-
ential experience. These reports were corroborated by similar
findings based on third-party observations of parent/child interac-
tions.
30. Id.; Plomin & Daniels, supra note 3, at 9.
31. REISS ET AL., supra note 5; Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 227.
32. Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 227.
33. See id. at 230.
34. See id.; REISS ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-10.
35. Id. at 169-71.
36. See id.; Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 230.
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Once differential experiences were identified, the second step
in the research program was to determine if the nonshared ex-
periences related to psychological outcomes. 7 The NEAD project
identified several relationships between specific nonshared experi-
ences and developmental outcomes. Plomin described an example
of these types of results:
[N]egative parental behaviour directed specifically to one
adolescent sibling (controlling for parental treatment of the
other sibling) relates strongly to that child's antisocial behav-
iour and, to a lesser extent, to that child's depression. Most of
these associations involve negative aspects of parenting, such
as conflict, and negative outcomes, such as antisocial behav-
iour. Associations are generally weaker for aspects of positive
381
parenting, such as affection.
These findings led to the tentative conclusion that parents treat
children differently and this differential treatment relates to dif-
ferential adjustment.
The third step in the research program, however, undermined
this tentative conclusion. Namely, addressing the question of
whether differential parenting is a cause of children's development
or an effect of children's behavior and development called into
question the presurption that differential parenting causes differ-
ential development.
The NEAD study, with its genetically sensitive design, allowed
the researchers to estimate the genetic mediation of the covari-
ance between family environment and adolescent outcome. This
type of analysis yielded an unexpected finding when, for example,
the associations between parental negativity and adolescent ad-
justment were examined. The NEAD researchers found that most
of the associations were mediated by genetic factors.4 0 As Plomin
has summarized,
[t]he finding of genetic mediation implies that, to a substan-
tial extent, differential parental treatment of siblings reflects
genetically influenced differences between the siblings. As
implausible as this finding might seem on first encounter, it is
part of the second great discovery of genetic research at the




40. See REISS ET AL., supra note 5, at 251.
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substantially to experience. The NEAD quest for non-shared
environment led to genotype-environment correlation; that
is, children select, modify, construct, and reconstruct their
experiences in part on the basis of their genetic propensi-
S41
ties.
In essence, the NEAD project found that children's genetic
makeup is a primary cause of the differential environments that
they experience within the family.42 Thus, the family environment
does appear to influence development, but it is the environment
that is constructed by children's genetic makeup and the behav-
ioral propensities that result from that genetic makeup.
The NEAD project failed to identify nonshared environmental
links with differential sibling outcomes. This failure likely resulted
from the NEAD project's focus on nonshared environmental fac-
tors that arise only within the family.43 Because of this failure,
researchers should now focus on extra-familial factors as good
candidates for components of the nonshared environment that
affect development. Possible extra-familial factors include peer
group interactions, interactions with adults other than parents,44
and chance events or occurrences. These types of factors could
constitute the nonshared environment independent of genetic ef-
fects. The bottom line is that further research is required to
discover nonshared environmental factors that have an independ-
ent effect on development.
Despite the failures of the NEAD project, it did reveal useful in-
formation concerning the importance of nonshared environment
in the development of personality traits and cognitive skills. To be-
gin, it confirmed many previous studies that found significant
genetic effects and significant environmental effects on personality
and cognitive development. 5 NEAD also confirmed the impor-
tance of nonshared environmental factors, with these factors
having a significantly larger impact on personality and cognitive
46development than shared environmental factors.
More specifically, the NEAD project analyzed the genetic and
environmental influences on seven major measures of adolescent
41. Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 231.
42. See id.; REISS ET AL., supra note 5.
43. See Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 231.
44. See id. at 229, 231.
45. See REISS ET AL., supra note 5, at 206-42.
46. See id. at 240-41.
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47
adjustment at two distinct points. These seven measures are anti-
social behavior, depression, cognitive agency, sociability, autonomy,
social responsibility, and self-worth. Antisocial behavior included
measures of whether a child exhibited behavioral problems at
school, was a bully or was mean to others, stole, lied, cheated,
skipped school, or engaged in aggressive behavior during the past
week to three months. Depression included whether a child had ex-
perienced sudden changes in mood, felt sad, withdrawn, depressed
or lonely, or exhibited depressed affect, poor appetite, or poor sleep
during the past week to three months. Cognitive agency included
measures of a child's school performance in several areas, degree of
positive regard in cognitive areas, and industriousness and orienta-
tion toward schoolwork. Sociability consisted of assessments of a
child's activities in social organizations, number of friends, positive
peer activity, involvement in organized pro-social activity, and qual-
ity of peer network. Autonomy was made up of measures of a
child's engagement in independent and self-reliant activity, initia-
tion of activities and transactions with community services, taking
care of self and belongings, and independent pursuit of leisure
and work activities. Social responsibility assessed whether a child
adhered to adult norms, exhibited helping and sharing behavior,
presented social maturity and internalized moral principles. Self-
worth measured a child's tendency to view self positively.
For each of the seven measures, genetic influences were signifi-48
cant. Genetic influences were especially substantial for antisocial
behavior, cognitive agency, and social responsibility. The NEAD
data indicated that the degree of heritability for each of these
three dimensions of adjustment is in excess of 65%. The heritabil-
ity for the other four measures approached 50%.
Environmental effects were also significant.49 Even for the three
measures for which genetic influences accounted for approxi-
mately 65% of the variation, environmental influences accounted
for approximately 35% of the variation. For five measures non-
shared environmental factors constitute the exclusive or
preponderant environmental component. These measures include
antisocial behavior, depression, cognitive agency, social responsi-
bility, and self-worth. Shared environmental factors have little or
no influence on the development of individual variations in these
areas of development. These findings from the NEAD project are
consistent with prior studies.
47. See id. at 113-18.
48. See id. at 209-11.
49. See id. at 211.
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The NEAD project found that shared environmental factors are
the preponderant environmental influences for both sociability
and autonomy.50 This finding concerning the importance of shared
environment is new and does not reflect the findings from prior
studies .5 Further studies are thus necessary in order to verify the
findings of the NEAD project concerning the effect of the shared
environment on development in the areas of sociability and
autonomy.
In addition to the findings across the seven measures, it is in-
structive to examine the detailed findings for each specific
measure of adolescent adjustment. The cognitive agency measure
provides a good starting point. As noted above, this measure exam-
ines a child's development of cognitive skills, largely assessed
through reports and observations of school performance. Attain-
ing a high level of achievement in school may constitute an
important goal and a detailed examination of the factors that af-
fect development in this area could be quite useful.
The NEAD project data indicated that at time 1 (earlier
adolescence) there was substantial genetic influence on cognitive
agency, with genetic factors accounting for 85% of the differential
development among individuals. 2 Also at time 1, nonshared
environmental factors accounted for 15% of individual differences
53
and shared environmental factors did not affect cognitive agency.
Three years later, at time 2 (later adolescence), genetic factors
accounted for 68% of the differences among individuals in terms of
cognitive agency, nonshared environment accounted for 30% of
differences, and shared environment accounted for 2% of
54differences. Thus, at both points genetic influences were
relatively strong, nonshared environment factors were significant,
and shared environment factors had a minimal impact on the
development of differences in cognitive agency among individuals.
In addition to these snapshots at specific points, the NEAD
project also examined change over the three-year period by
determining, the degree of stability for each measure of adolescent
adjustment." Initially, the NEAD project data indicated that
cognitive agency is very stable between earlier adolescence and
later adolescence, with a correlation factor of .71. This means that
50. Id.
51. Id.
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children who are doing well in school at early adolescence will
likely be doing well at late adolescence and those who are
performing poorly at early adolescence will likely be performing
poorly at late adolescence.
Beyond this general finding of stability, the model testing results
from the NEAD data revealed that genetic influences were the
primary contributors to stability in cognitive agency.5 Genetic in-
fluences account for 94% of the stability. Thus, most of the genetic
effects at time 1 remained at time 2 and played a substantial role in
maintaining stability in cognitive agency across time.
Of course, cognitive agency measures did not correlate 100%
from time 1 to time 2. Some change does occur from earlier ado-
lescence to later adolescence. The model testing results from the
NEAD data indicated that changes in the nonshared environment
account for 67% of the change in cognitive agency during this pe-
riod, while genetic factors account for 33% of the change.
Reiss concludes the discussion of cognitive agency by stating,
"most of the genetic effects shown as important at each time pe-
riod are involved in maintaining stability in cognitive agency across
time. Virtually all the nonshared effects change over time and are
associated with change in cognitive agency from earlier to later
adolescence. "-5 It is clear that nonshared environmental factors
play an important role in a child's development in terms of cogni-
tive agency during this stage of life.
Another measure of adolescent adjustment that is useful to ex-
amine is depression. Depression measures a child's mood, affect,
feelings of sadness, withdrawal, loneliness, eating habits, and sleep-
ing quality. These measures are important in assessing a child's
daily functioning and happiness. Many who assess child wellbeing
would be likely to find such measures relevant to their effort and
would be interested in a detailed examination of the factors that
affect development in this area.
The NEAD project data at time 1 revealed substantial genetic in-
fluences on depression. 9 Genetic factors account for 75% of
differential development among individuals in the area of depres-
sion. Also important at time 1 were nonshared environmental
factors, accounting for 25% of individual differences. Shared envi-
ronmental factors exhibit no influence on depression measures at
time 1. At time 2, the influence of genetic factors was much less,
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 225-27.
59. See id. at 224-25.
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accounting for 44% of individual differences. Nonshared envi-
ronmental factors were much more important, accounting for 53%
of differences. Shared environmental factors remained weak, ac-
counting for 3% of differences. Thus, as opposed to cognitive
agency measures, there are significant changes in the relative con-
tributions of the three relevant factors on depression. However, at
both points, genetic influences are significant, nonshared envi-
ronmental factors are strong, and shared environmental influences
are very weak or nonexistent.
As with cognitive agency, change in depression measures occur
from earlier adolescence to later adolescence, with differing con-
tributions to stability and change being made by the three relevant60
components. The model testing results from the NEAD data
showed that genetic factors account for the preponderant compo-
nent of stability (73%). Conversely, the NEAD data revealed that
nonshared environmental factors account for 73% of change in
depression measures. The shared environment plays no role in
either stability or change in depression. Describing his conclusions
on depression, Reiss states:
[W] e can recognize, even from analyses at two single or cross-
sectional points in time, that genetic influence declines
substantially from earlier to later adolescence and that there
is an increase in nonshared influences in later adolescence.
Indeed, [NEAD data clarify] that the majority of genetic
influences during this developmental period account for
stability, but that most of the nonshared influences account
for change. 
(
Thus, as for cognitive agency, one interested in affecting depres-
sion during this period of development would be wise to focus on
the components of a child's nonshared environment.
The findings related to cognitive agency and depression are
representative of the other three measures of adolescent adjust-
ment that reveal substantial nonshared environmental influences
and minimal shared environmental influences (i.e., antisocial be-
havior, social responsibility, self-worth).62 Stability is largely driven
by genetic factors, and to a lesser degree, shared environmental
60. See id. at 225.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 220-34.
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factors (i.e., antisocial behavior), while change is primarily driven
by nonshared environmental factors.
However, the two measures of adolescent adjustment that reveal
significant shared environmental influences differ. Although the
findings indicating significant shared environmental influences in
the areas of sociability and autonomy are new and have yet to be
verified, they should not be ignored. In fact, the NEAD project did
not ignore them, subjecting them to a full analysis concerning sta-
bility and change.
The measures of sociability provide a good example of this
analysis. Sociability measures a child's organized social activity,
number of friends and quality of peer network. These measures
are important in assessing the development of associational skills,
the possession of which may be considered desirable for adults in a
large pluralistic democratic society.
The NEAD project data at time 1 revealed significant genetic in-
fluences on sociability.63  Genetic factors accounted for
approximately 60% of differential development among individuals
in the area of sociability. Also at time 1, shared environmental in-
fluences accounted for appropriately 30% of differences, and
nonshared environmental factors accounted for appropriately 10%
of differences. At time 2, the relative influence of genetic, shared
environmental, and nonshared environmental factors was about
the same as at time 1. Thus at both points, genetic influence was
substantial, shared environmental influence was significant, and
nonshared environmental influence was important, but less impor-
tant than the shared environment.
These findings gave rise to the possibility that shared
environmental factors have a significant impact, independent of
genetic influences, on adolescents' development in the area of
sociability. Examination of the sources of stability and change in
this area, however, diminished the likelihood of this possibility.
While shared environmental factors account for 41% of stability in
sociability from time 1 to time 2, these factors play virtually no role
in change in sociability.4 Genetic influences account for 77% of
change during this period of adolescence, with nonshared
65environmental factors accounting for the remainder of change.
Thus, as with the other five measures of adolescent adjustment
discussed above, one attempting to effect change during this
63. See id. at 210, 227-29.
64. Id. at 227-29.
65. Id.
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period in the area of sociability would be wise to focus on
nonshared environmental factors.
Autonomy is the only measure of adolescent adjustment for
which the NEAD findings do not lead one to focus on the non-
shared environment. 6" Although shared environmental factors
contribute substantially to stability in autonomy during adoles-
cence, these factors also account for 32% of change in autonomy.
And although nonshared environmental factors contribute almost
exclusively to change in autonomy, they are insignificant in magni-
tude. Thus, autonomy is the one area of adolescent adjustment
that points to shared environmental factors as having the potential
to influence development in the period from earlier to later ado-
lescence.
Overall, the NEAD project data confirm prior behavioral
genetic studies that identified components of the nonshared
environment as the primary environmental factors that account for
differential development among individuals within a population.
During the period from earlier to later adolescence, the
nonshared environment constitutes the primary influence for
developmental change in the areas of antisocial behavior,
depression, cognitive agency, sociability, social responsibility and
self-worth.
However, as discussed above, the NEAD project failed in its
effort to identify specific components of the nonshared
environment that lead to specific developmental changes and
outcomes. The specific nonshared environmental factors that
contribute to certain developmental outcomes remain a mystery.
The only insight on this subject is provided by the finding that
nonshared environmental factors that arise from experiences
within the family do not appear to have a significant impact on
differential development. Thus, the nonshared environmental
factors that contribute significantly to differential development
during adolescence must arise from experiences outside the family
association. Furthermore, the nature and identity of these
developmentally significant nonshared environmental factors
remains uncertain. In conclusion, uncertainty reigns in the area
of adolescent development. How to affect development during
adolescence through the manipulation of environmental factors is
largely a mystery.
66. See id. at 229-32.
67. See Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 231.
68. See id.; REiSS ET AL., supra note 5, at 417-26.
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The findings from behavioral genetic studies to date call for ad-
ditional studies of child development that involve more than one
child from each family unit, and thus, are genetically sensitive.
These types of studies hold out the hope of identifying environ-
mental influences on differential development. In light of the
NEAD project results, researchers should focus on environmental
influences that arise outside the family association and constitute
part of a child's unique, nonshared environment. Such influences
may include relationships with peers, interactions with adults other
than parents, and discrete chance events (e.g., accidents, illnesses,
trauma) .69
As Reiss points out, these types of studies are extremely difficult
to design and implement.70 They also require a good deal of time,
with the twelve year NEAD project illustrating this point. In light of
these difficulties, it is highly unlikely that researchers will identify
the primary environmental influences on differential development
anytime soon. The scientific endeavor will proceed incrementally,
adding slowly to our knowledge of differential development at the
various stages of childhood.
But the fact that the whole picture has not been developed, and
is currently only a fuzzy vision labeled "nonshared environment,"
should not prevent legal scholars from beginning to use what we
know and from preparing to address future findings. As stated
above, what we do know is that the nonshared environment is the
primary influence on differential development once a certain
minimal level of care has been provided. This finding raises the
question of whether the laws related to child wellbeing are focused
on relevant considerations. The best interests of the child decision
rule which is used by judges in resolving divorce custody disputes
between two fit parents provides a specific context in which to raise
this question. This raises the further question of whether a rational
child-focused rule of decision in this specific area is plausible in
light of the uncertainty surrounding the factors that influence dif-
ferential development. The remainder of this article uses the
knowledge from behavioral genetic studies to address these two
specific questions.
69. Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 229, 231.
70. REISS ET AL., supra note 5, at 7; see also Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at
231.
The Child Decision Rule
IV. AN EXAMINATION OF THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD DECISION RULE
Before examining factors included in a state's actual best inter-
ests of the child decision rule, it is useful to illustrate the process of
critique this article employs in examining such factors. Such an
illustration makes the logic of critique clear.
Take for example, a best interest of the child decision rule that
seeks to assure optimal developmental outcomes by including the
number of books in the home as an important factor in awarding
custody between two fit parents. If an adolescent child's father has
an extensive, age-appropriate library and actively encourages read-
ing, he will "win" on this factor when compared to the child's
mother who merely maintains two adult news magazines in her
home. The father will have significantly enhanced his chances of
obtaining custody by maintaining the extensive library.
The findings from behavioral genetic studies would call such a
factor into serious question. The number of books in the home is a
classic component of the shared environment. All children in the
family are likely to share this environmental condition. But shared
environmental conditions do not affect differential adolescent de-
velopment to a significant degree. The inclusion of the books-in-
the-home factor thus appears misguided because it is largely irrele-
vant to the goals of the decision rule.
This same critique could be made for other classic shared
environmental factors such as parental choice of residential
neighborhood and parental socioeconomic status. These factors
are not relevant to the goal of securing optimal child
developmental outcomes. They may be relevant to other goals
such as maximizing current child happiness or determining
parental interests, but their inclusion in the decision rule must be
justified on grounds other than securing optimal developmental
outcomes.
The examination of factors included in an actual best interests
of the child decision rule does not yield as clear a picture as the
illustrations above. This is because the actual factors are not as
clearly focused on shared environmental factors. But an examina-
tion of these factors and how the courts have applied them does
indicate a focus on shared environmental factors, and thus, allows
for a critique similar to that used in the illustrations.
The definition and application of the best interests of the child
decision rule in Michigan reflects the approach taken in many
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states. 7' The decision standard has been defined by the Michigan
legislature. The applicable statute begins by stating, "As used in
this act, 'best interests of the child' means the sum total of the fol-
lowing factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the,,72
court. The statute then lists eleven provisions and adds "any
other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular
child custody dispute. 
'
73
Despite the open-ended catchall provision at the end, the
Michigan courts have primarily focused on the eleven provisions
74
delineated by the legislature. An examination of recent court de-
cisions reveals that judges, both at the trial and appellate court
levels, have wrestled with applying the eleven provisions to the
specific facts presented in the cases before them. The courts ap-
pear to score each parent on each provision, with the parent who
is favored by such scoring being awarded primary physical custody.
The overarching goal of the best interests of the child decision
rule is for a judge to choose the best caretaking environment (usu-
ally between those offered by two fit parents) that will allow for the
71. See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-
Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215 (1991); David J. Herring, Rearranging the Family:
Diversity, Pluralism, Social Tolerance and Child Custody Disputes, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 205
(1997).
72. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23(3) (West 2002). The eleven provisions are: (a)
The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the
child; (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affec-
tion, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her
religion or creed, if any; (c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide
the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permit-
ted tinder the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs; (d) The
length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of
maintaining continuity; (e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes; (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved; (g) The mental and
physical health of the parties involved; (h) The home, school, and community record of the
child; (i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of
stIfficient age to express preference; (j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to
facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child
and the other parent or the child and the parents; (k) Domestic violence, regardless of
whether the violence was directed against, or witnessed by the child; and (1) Any other fac-
tor considered by the court to he relevant to a particular child custody dispute.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Ireland v. Smith, 547 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 1996); MacBeth v. MacBeth-
Scarlett, No. 226912, 2000 "AIL 33389853, at *2-*4 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2000); Hilliard v.
Schmidt, 586 N.W.2d 263, 266-68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), overruled by Molloy v. Mollo 637
N.W.2d 803, 804 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 643 N.W.2d. 574
(Mich. 2002); McCain v. McCain, 580 N.W.2d 485, 487-88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); Harper v.
Harpe, 502 N.W.2d 731, 733-36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Bowers v. Bowers, 497 N.W.2d 602,
606-08 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
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best chance of healthy development and positive adult outcomes.
With this long-term developmental goal in mind, it is important to
assess whether the factors identified as relevant by the legislature
truly matter in terms of child developmental processes and out-
comes. The information from behavioral genetic studies allows us
to make such an assessment of each provision.
Nine of the eleven provisions enunciated by the Michigan legis-
lature relate primarily to shared environmental factors. Provision
(c) stands somewhat apart among these nine in that it appears to
focus on securing a minimally adequate caretaking environment
for children affected by a custody dispute. This provision requires
the court to assess "the capacity and disposition of the parties in-
volved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care ... ,
and other material needs."76 This provision appears to require the
courts to determine whether each party can provide a minimal
baseline of care for the child.
This is an important determination even though it is primarily a
measure of shared environmental factors. (Each child in the
party's custody would likely have similar experiences in terms of
the level of food, clothing, medical care and material provisions.)
This provision focuses the judge's attention on whether the family
environment is minimally adequate. Because behavioral genetic
studies have only examined shared family environments that are at77
or above a minimally acceptable level of care, these studies have
not called into question the importance of determining whether a
proposed family environment is minimally adequate. In fact, re-
searchers have expressly noted that family environments that fall
below a minimally adequate level because of abuse or neglect are
not part of their studies or their findings concerning the relatively
insignificant impact of shared environmental factors. 78 Thus, it
seems appropriate for judges to assess the capacity of each party
seeking custody to establish a minimally adequate family environ-
ment.
The other eight provisions within the Michigan law that focus
on shared environmental factors address family conditions that
75. See Wilson v. Upell, 325 N.W.2d 611, 613-14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Robert H.
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminancy, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 251, 257, 260-61.
76. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23(3) (c) (West 2002).
77. See David C. Rowe, Are Parents to Blame? A Look at the Antisocial Personalities, 8 Psy-
CHOL. INQUIRY 251, 254 (1997); see also Robert Plomin, Two Views About the Nurture
Assumption: Parents and Personality, 44 CONTEMP. PSYCHOL. APA REV. BOOKS 269, 270 (1999).
78. See Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 226; Rowe, supra note 77; Plomin,
supra note 77.
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mostly extend beyond a determination of basic, minimally ade-
quate fitness. For example, provision (f) directs the court to assess
the "moral fitness" of the parties involved.79 The moral fitness of
the custodial parent will primarily contribute to the construction
of environmental circumstances that will be shared by any child
within the family. Although a certain degree of moral fitness may
be required in order to assure minimally adequate caretaking, trial
courts have applied this factor to assess relative moral fitness on
matters that do not relate to the establishment of minimally ade-
quate conditions for child development.80
Provisions (g) and (k) are similar to factor (f). These provisions
direct the courts to consider the "mental and physical health" of
the parties involved and the "domestic violence" history for each81
party. As with (f), these provisions go primarily to the construc-
tion of a certain type of shared environment and trial courts have
applied them to examine conditions unrelated to securing only a
minimally adequate environment."' Courts use these provisions
primarily to compare the parties' capacity to structure a desirable
shared family environment and to award custody to the parent
deemed "best."
Provisions (d) and (e) direct the court to assess the stability and
permanence of the proposed custodial homes.s The degree of sta-
bility offered by each parent relates to environmental
circumstances shared by children within the family unit. For the
most part, children placed with a particular parent will experience
a similar degree of stability and permanence.
In addition, provisions (a), (b), and (j) direct the judge to assess
the love and affection provided by each parent, the educational
choices and religious training provided by each parent, and each84
parent's support for visitation with the other parent. Again, each
child within the proposed family unit will experience these provi-
sions mostly in the same way. The parent is likely to provide each
child with a similar degree of love and affection, to make similar
educational and religious choices for each child, and to support a
79. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23(3) (f) (West 2002).
80. See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 526 N.W.2d 889, 895-96 (Mich. 1994); Hilliard, 586 N.W.2d
263, 267; Wilson, 325 N.W.2d at 613; but see Bowers, 497 N.W.2d 602, 607-08 (holding that the
trial court completely failed to assess relative moral fitness of the parents).
81. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23(3) (g), (k) (West 2002).
82. See Bowers, 497 N.W.2d at 608; Wilson, 325 N.W.2d at 613; but see HUlliard, 586
N.W.2d at 267-68 (holding that trial court properly considered the mental and physical
health of the parties and the domestic violence history for each party); Harper, 502 N.W.2d
731,735-36.
83. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23(3) (d), (e) (West 2002).
84. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23(3) (a), (b), (j) (West 2002).
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similar degree of visitation for each child.s5 In summary, the eight
provisions discussed in this paragraph primarily focus the courts
on an assessment of shared environmental factors.
Two of the eleven provisions set out by the Michigan legislature
have the potential to focus the courts on factors that constitute a
child's nonshared environment. Provision (h) calls for the court to
assess the "home, school, and community record of the child." 6
With a flexible interpretation of the word "record," this provision
could be construed to direct the courts to conduct an assessment
of environmental influences outside the family setting that would
affect each child in a unique manner. Such influences are impor-
tant components of the nonshared environment, especially in light
of the NEAD study's findings concerning the lack of significant
nonshared environmental influences arising within the family.81
Unfortunately, in deciding custody disputes, the courts have
largely failed to use this provision to examine the nonshared envi-
ronmental influences that will result from their decisions. 8" Judges
use this factor mostly to assess the child's past progress and current
status in school. If the child appears to be doing well, the claim of
the current custodial parent is enhanced through an implicit as-
sumption that this parent can provide the child with the "best"
family setting when compared to the other parent. Thus, the po-
tential this factor presents for a detailed assessment of important
nonshared environmental influences is largely unrealized.
Provision (i) directs the courts to consider the "reasonable
preference of the child."8 Listening to a specific child certainly
offers ajudge an opportunity to explore the unique perceptions and
feelings of the subject child. These unique perceptions and feelings
may constitute and/or reflect the child's nonshared environment.
However, this process is extremely limited as a tool for assessing
nonshared environmental factors. The NEAD project's findings
indicate that a child's differential or unique perception of shared
events within the family does not constitute a significant
environmental influence on differential development. Judges,
85. See Rowe, supra note 18, at 4.
86. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23 (3) (h) (West 2002).
87. See REiss ET AL., supra note 5, at 409.
88. See, e.g., MacBeth, No. 226192, 2000 WL 33389853, at *3; McCain, 580 N.W.2d 485,
488; DeRush v. DeRush, 554 N.W.2d 322, 323 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Harper, 502 N.W.2d
731,736.
89. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23 (3) (i) (West 2002).
90. See REISS ET AL., supra note 5, at 417-26; Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26,
at 231.
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unfortunately, tend to focus their examination of children on
aspects of the shared environment within the family context.9'
Examination of the Michigan provisions that are relevant to a
determination of a child's best interests indicates that the focus is
primarily on shared environmental influences. This focus is likely
the result of the common assumption that parental nurture is a
92
primary source of a child's differential developmental outcomes.
But behavioral genetic studies challenge this assumption in the
strongest terms. Parental nurture largely goes into constructing a
child's shared environment, and the studies indicate that the
shared environment has a minimal influence on differential child
developmental outcomes.93 This is especially true for the period
from earlier to later adolescence as examined in the NEAD 
study.94
It necessarily follows that these studies call into question the
common approach to assessing the best interests of an adolescent
child. Beyond the assurance of a minimally adequate family envi-
ronment, the shared environment created through parental
nurture does not affect adolescent development to a significant
degree. The primary influences on differential development occur
in the nonshared environment-an environment that exists largely
outside the general nurturing environment provided by parents to
all children within the family. The courts' current approach to ap-
plying the best interests of the child standard is largely misdirected
in cases involving two fit parents, each of whom can provide their
adolescent children with a minimally adequate family environ-
ment, because it primarily focuses on factors that constitute a
child's shared environment.
This misdirected effort may open the door to the expression
and exercise of judicial bias. Judges, like many individuals, often
have a preconceived notion of an appropriate or "best" shared
family environment. As has been noted by numerous critics of the
best interests of the child standard, these individual judicial biases
render the standard indeterminate and unfair.95 The findings from
behavioral genetic studies add another basis for criticizing this de-
cision rule. Not only are judicial assumptions and biases given free
reign under the best interests of the child standard, but these as-
sumptions and biases arise out of largely irrelevant considerations
related to a child's shared environment.
91. See, e.g., Hilliard, 586 N.W.2d 263; Bowers, 497 N.W.2d 602, 607-08.
92. See HARRIS, supra note 1.
93. See Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 225.
94. See REISS ET AL., supra note 5, at 307.
95. See Mnookin, supra note 75; Schneider, supra note 71, at 2216; Herring, supra note
71, at 223.
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Although the data from behavioral genetic studies indicate that,
as currently applied, the best interests of the child standard is
largely misguided, these same data do not identify the appropriate
inquiries for a determination of a child's best interests. The factors
that cause differential development during the adolescent period
remain shrouded. The NEAD project researchers identified some
general components of the nonshared environment that appear to
affect differential development, but they also admitted that they
had failed to identify specific elements of the nonshared environ-
96ment that cause differential outcomes. Thus, the behavioral
genetic research completed to date does not provide a basis for
specifying the environmental conditions relevant to a determina-
tion of a child's best interests.
What the data do reveal is that uncertainty reigns in the area of
child development. Thus, behavioral genetic studies to date verify
and reinforce Robert Mnookin's perceptive insights into the best
interests standard. In his classic article in 1975, Professor Mnookin
described the problems confronted by judges applying the best
97interests standard. Using decision theory concepts, he explained
three requirements for a rule of decision to function effectively.
First, the decisionmaker needs a great deal of information so that
she can identify and specify possible outcomes. In the context of a
child custody decision,
the judge would require information about how each parent
had behaved in the past, how this behavior had affected the
child, and the child's present condition. Then the judge
would need to predict the future behavior and circumstances
of each parent if the child were to remain with that parent
and to gauge the effects of this behavior and these circum-
stances on the child. He would also have to consider the
behavior of each parent if the child were to live with the other
parent and how this might affect the child. If a custody award
to one parent would require removing the child from his pre-
sent circumstances, school, friends, and familiar surrounding,
the judge would necessarily wish to predict the effects these
changes would have on the child.98
96. See REISS ET AL., supra note 5, at 417-26; Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at
231.
97. Mnookin, supra note 75.
98. Id. at 257.
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Professor Mnookin questioned the capacity of any judge to as-
certain the necessary information.
The rational decisionmaker would need not only a great deal of
information, but also the capacity to assess the probability of alter-
native outcomes engendered in a specific decision. Only in this
way could the decisionmaker calculate the predicted value of a
specific decision and rationally compare all possible decisions.
[E]ven where a judge has substantial information about the
child's past home life and the present alternatives, present-
day knowledge about human behavior provides no basis for
the kind of individualized predictions required by the best-
interests standard. There are numerous competing theories
of human behavior, based on radically different conceptions
of the nature of man, and no consensus exists that any one is
correct. No theory at all is considered widely capable of gen-
erating reliable predictions about the psychological and
behavioral consequences of alternative dispositions for a par-
ticular child. 99
The difficulty of calculating predicted values for the range of
decisions possible in a specific child custody case is formidable.
Even if the judge could gather sufficient information to gener-
ate accurate predictions and could competently assess the
probabilities for each predicted outcome in order to assign pre-
dicted values to each possible decision, the judge would also need
a set of values to apply in determining a child's best interests. Pro-
fessor Mnookin articulated the difficult questions raised by this
requirement for rational decisionmaking. For example, should the
judge focus on the child's happiness, the child's spiritual training,
or the child's ultimate economic productivity? Noting that these
questions could be elaborated endlessly, Mnookin stated:
And yet, where is the judge to look for the set of values that
should inform the choice of what is best for the child? Nor-
mally, the custody statutes do not themselves give content or
relative weights to the pertinent values. And if the judge looks
to society at large, he finds neither a clear consensus as to the
best child rearing strategies nor an appropriate hierarchy of
ultimate values.l°
99. Id. at 258.
100. Id.at260-61.
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Mnookin concluded that "[d]eciding what is best for a child
poses a question no less ultimate than the purposes and values of
life itself."' °' The hope that a judge would be able to answer this
ultimate question is quite unrealistic. In addition, calling on a state
actor such as a judge to answer this ultimate question is very trou-
bling within a large pluralistic democratic society.02
The findings from behavioral genetic studies are especially per-
tinent to the first two requirements of rational decisionmaking
articulated by Professor Mnookin. As noted above, these findings
reveal that uncertainty reigns in the area of child development.
This uncertainty is so fundamental that we do not even know what
information to gather for a rational decision in this area. What we
know is that the nonshared environment is the primary influence
on a child's development, especially during the period from earlier
to later adolescence. However, we do not know what specific as-
pects of the nonshared environment impact child development or
how nonshared environmental factors affect development.
The results of the NEAD project indicate that the nonshared
environmental factors that significantly impact differential devel-
opment do not arise within the family association. Plomin
speculates that the relevant factors may arise within peer groups,
from interactions with adults outside the family setting, or from
chance events that affect the individual child in a unique man-103
ner. The latter possibility is the null hypothesis, but it stands as a
very real possibility that must be kept in mind as research pro-
ceeds. Plomin notes that two findings from behavioral genetic
research point to the importance of chance:
We also need to consider the gloomy prospect that chance con-
tributes to nonshared environment in terms of random noise,
idiosyncratic experiences, or the subtle interplay of a concate-
nation of events .... Our view, nonetheless, is that chance is
the null hypothesis, although measures of life events can assess
some of its aspects. Systematic sources of nonshared environ-
ment need to be thoroughly examined before we dismiss it as
chance. Chance might only be a label for our current inability
to identify the processes by which children-even pairs of
101. Id at 260.
102. See Herring, supra note 71 (critiquing the best interests of the child standard and
assessing alternative decision standards in light of the political functions of the family in
American society).
103. See Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 229, 231.
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identical twins-growing up in the same family come to be so
different."4
Despite Plomin's hope for future research findings, continued
failure to identify specific nonshared environmental factors that
influence differential development will lead to a conclusion that
differential development results primarily from simple chance
events or fortuity.
Whether or not future research identifies important specific
nonshared environmental influences other than idiosyncratic,
chance events, it is obvious that under the current state of knowl-
edge we cannot make valid predictions concerning a child's future
development in alternative settings. Judges are unable to gather
the information necessary for a valid custody decision for an ado-
lescent child because no one knows what information is relevant.
Do they need information that allows them to compare a child's
peer relationships within competing custody arrangements? Do
they need information on the different school settings? And if they
need such information, what specific aspects of peer relationships
or school settings impact differential development?
We do not have answers for any of these questions, and thus, a
decisionmaker cannot gather relevant information, rationally pre-
dict alternative outcomes, assign probabilities to each alternative
outcome, or compute predicted values for possible custody ar-
rangements. Therefore, even if we could agree on a set of values to
apply in assessing predicted outcomes (Mnookin's third element
for rational decisionmaking), we would still be unable to make ra-
tional decisions under the best interests of the child standard. Just
as Professor Mnookin set out in his article in the mid-1970's, in-105
herent uncertainty reigns in this area. The findings of behavioral
genetic studies make this bottom line point even more forcefully.
The other conclusion behavioral genetic studies allow us to
reach is that our current belief in the overriding importance of
parental influence and the family environment is in error. The
NEAD study found that the shared family environment con-
structed by parents is largely irrelevant to differential development
during adolescence.1 0 6 In addition, the findings from earlier studies
indicate that the shared environment may be just as irrelevant for
younger children.17 Thus, once a parent establishes that he or she
104. Id. at 231-32.
105. See Mnookin, supra note 75, at 255-61.
106. SeeREISS ETAL., supra note 5, at 239.
107. See id.; Plomin & Daniels, supra note 3.
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will provide the child a minimally adequate family environment, a
judge contemplating a custody decision would be wise to focus on
factors that constitute the child's nonshared environment. These
factors are where the action is in terms of differential or distinctive
individual development.
In the end, the behavioral genetic studies point to the need for
additional genetically sensitive studies. At a minimum, this means
that child development researchers should conduct studies that
examine more than one child within each family. Only in this way
will we be able to identify and understand the specific components
of the nonshared environment that contribute to differential de-
velopment.'O" Such knowledge may someday allow judges to utilize
a rational decisionmaking approach in applying the best interests
of the child standard. Judges may then be able to gather the neces-
sary information, accurately delineate possible outcomes, assign
probabilities to each possible outcome, and calculate a predicted
value for each possible custody decision.
Additional studies could be very helpful in answering several ex-
tremely pertinent questions even before a rational decisionmaking
approach would be fully viable. For example, new studies may help
to define what conditions are necessary to establish a minimally
adequate family environment below which legal decisionmakers
should be concerned with more than the environmental factors
that contribute to differential development. Childhood maltreat-
ment at some significant level would likely affect a child even if the
maltreatment were a facet of a child's shared environment.09 By
conducting genetically sensitive studies that include children in
abusive and neglectful family environments and children in non-
abusive, non-neglectful family environments, behavioral geneticists
may be able to define the conditions necessary for a minimally
adequate shared environment and for minimally adequate parent-
ing. Such definition would be extremely helpful to legal
decisionmakers in child dependency matters, and legal scholars
should follow the development of knowledge in this area closely,
applying new findings to inform and alter legislative and judicial
decisionmaking.
If they do not conclude that chance events are the primary in-
fluences on differential development, additional studies could also
identify specific environmental factors that do matter to differen-
tial development once a minimal floor of care exists. Even before a
108. See Plomin, Asbury & Dunn, supra note 26, at 231.
109. See id.; Rowe, supra note 77; Plomin, supra note 77.
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rational decisionmaking approach is fully viable, such knowledge
may be helpful to legal decisionmakers. For example, if future
studies indicate that peer relationships influence differential de-
velopmental to a non-trivial degree, then judges may want to
examine the different peer groups the specific child will be ex-
posed to while in the custody of a particular parent. Such an
examination would be more useful than examining the degree of
love and affection that will be provided by the particular parent to
all children in his or her care. Again, legal scholars should call for
these types of additional studies and should pay attention to the
findings generated within the scientific community.
Until additional studies are undertaken and completed, judicial
decisionmakers must do the best they can. With the current state
of our knowledge, this probably means two things. First, judges
should focus on determining that each parent involved in a par-
ticular custody dispute has the capacity to provide affected
children with a minimally adequate family environment. Although
we do not know with great precision what constitutes a minimally
adequate family environment, we do have studies that indicate the
negative effects of a seriously abusive or neglectful family envi-
ronment.1 These effects are likely to arise, at least in part,
independently from genetic factors and as a result of shared envi-
ronmental factors. Thus, examining shared environmental factors
as they relate to minimal adequacy would appear to be feasible and
worth a decisionmaker's time and effort.
Once a judge determines that each parent can provide a mini-
mally adequate environment of care, the judge should realize that
she does not have the capacity to make a rational custody decision
pursuant to the best interests of the child standard. She does not
have the capacity to determine which household will be "best" for
the affected children even if she has a clear set of social values de-
fining what would constitute optimal child outcomes.
This means that the judge should invoke an alternative rule of
decision-one that may be more realistic in terms of our current
knowledge of differential child development within a minimally
adequate family setting (e.g., flip of a coin, approximate past fam-
ily settings). 1 It also means that the stakes are lower in terms of
child outcomes. Because so much is uncertain, and rational deci-
sionmaking is impossible, ajudge cannot be deemed to have made
a horrible mistake in awarding custody to one fit parent over an-
other. In addition, these conditions for decisionmaking mean that
110. See REISS ET AL., supra note 5, at 161; Rowe, supra note 77.
111. See Herring, supra note 71.
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the door is open for us to consider goals other than those related
to ultimate child developmental outcomes (e.g. securing current
child happiness, defining and securing parental interests). 
2
The current lack of knowledge concerning child development
affords us another important luxury. It allows us to contemplate
how we should proceed once we gain the knowledge necessary to
meet Professor Mnookin's first two conditions for rational deci-
sionmaking in the custody area. For example, we could decide to
use our developing scientific knowledge to vigorously pursue the
best outcomes for children involved in custody disputes. We could
work to structure their non-shared environments in a way that we
would know would lead to certain types of positive outcomes.
However, we may want to forsake the path of trying to predict ul-
timate child outcomes. Other social and political goals may lead us
to embrace uncertainty in this area. In a large pluralistic democ-
racy there may be a great deal to be said for randomness in terms
of child or citizen outcomes. 13 As we come to realize that findings
from behavioral genetics studies have destroyed our assumptions
concerning our current capacity to determine and secure a child's
best interests through decisions in child custody disputes, we
should consider whether we want to pursue this goal beyond pro-
viding at least a minimally adequate family environment as our
knowledge develops.
CONCLUSION
Although this article fails to give guidance in the construction of
an appropriate decision rule in child custody disputes, it brings
important scientific information to bear on our current practices
and calls these practices into question. In doing so, this article
provides a starting point for an incremental approach to relating
future behavioral genetic research findings to this area of law. In
addition, this article encourages us to take advantage of the
opportunity provided by our current state of recognized ignorance
and uncertainty-an opportunity to carefully and thoughtfully
identify our goals in this area of decisionmaking. Legal scholarship
needs to address both inquiries simultaneously, with constant
112. See Plomin, supra note 77.
113. See Herring, supra note 71.
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dialogue and interaction between those engaged in the two
scholarly endeavors.
